9781003125860_10.4324_9781003125860-10.pdf

Do humans have abilities to perform scientific experiments? Do humans possess real powers for performing scientific experiments? I shall treat these two questions in turn where the first will bring us to the second. I shall argue that the scientific image of humans must cohere with the manifest imag...

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Έκδοση: Taylor & Francis 2023
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-616542024-03-27T14:14:36Z Chapter 7 The Power to Perform Experiments De Haan, Daniel D. William M.R. Simpson, Robert Koons, James Orr, Nicholas Teh, Hasok Chang, Stephen Boulter, David Oderberg, Janice Chik, Daniel De Haan, Antonio Ramos-Diaz, Christopher Hauser, Travis Dumsday, Ross Inman, Anne Peterson, Edward Feser, Alexander Pruss, Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics, theology of nature, science and theology, Aristotelianism, naturalism, pluralism, substantial powers, materialism, thermochemical powers, proportionality, evolution, essentialism, animal powers, causal powers, experiments, mathematical powers, hylomorphism, philosophy of nature, grounding thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy::QDT Topics in philosophy::QDTJ Philosophy: metaphysics and ontology thema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QR Religion and beliefs::QRA Religion: general::QRAB Philosophy of religion Do humans have abilities to perform scientific experiments? Do humans possess real powers for performing scientific experiments? I shall treat these two questions in turn where the first will bring us to the second. I shall argue that the scientific image of humans must cohere with the manifest image of humans as having the ability to exercise rational embodied control, which constitutes the power to perform scientific experiments. I first argue why rational embodied control is indispensable to the ability to perform a scientific experiment. I then argue that an ontology of causal powers provides the best explanation for this ability to make the causal difference in reality required for scientists to effectively perform scientific experiments and arrive at scientific truths. I then conclude by considering a major objection against the alternative standard causal theory of action, which would also undermine the thesis that scientists perform experiments. I show why neo-Aristotelian causal power realism does not face this objection in its explanation of how scientists exercise real rational embodied causal control within their experiments. 2023-03-08T10:58:17Z 2023-03-08T10:58:17Z 2022 chapter 9780367637149 9780367646981 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/61654 eng application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 9781003125860_10.4324_9781003125860-10.pdf Taylor & Francis Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Theology of Nature Routledge 10.4324/9781003125860-10 10.4324/9781003125860-10 7b3c7b10-5b1e-40b3-860e-c6dd5197f0bb c68a71d7-d439-455c-9cd2-42a748157fd0 d09f4ed8-30ae-4da8-85b7-f3af555a6f33 9780367637149 9780367646981 Routledge 29 Templeton World Charity Foundation Templeton World Charity Foundation, Inc. open access
institution OAPEN
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language English
description Do humans have abilities to perform scientific experiments? Do humans possess real powers for performing scientific experiments? I shall treat these two questions in turn where the first will bring us to the second. I shall argue that the scientific image of humans must cohere with the manifest image of humans as having the ability to exercise rational embodied control, which constitutes the power to perform scientific experiments. I first argue why rational embodied control is indispensable to the ability to perform a scientific experiment. I then argue that an ontology of causal powers provides the best explanation for this ability to make the causal difference in reality required for scientists to effectively perform scientific experiments and arrive at scientific truths. I then conclude by considering a major objection against the alternative standard causal theory of action, which would also undermine the thesis that scientists perform experiments. I show why neo-Aristotelian causal power realism does not face this objection in its explanation of how scientists exercise real rational embodied causal control within their experiments.
title 9781003125860_10.4324_9781003125860-10.pdf
spellingShingle 9781003125860_10.4324_9781003125860-10.pdf
title_short 9781003125860_10.4324_9781003125860-10.pdf
title_full 9781003125860_10.4324_9781003125860-10.pdf
title_fullStr 9781003125860_10.4324_9781003125860-10.pdf
title_full_unstemmed 9781003125860_10.4324_9781003125860-10.pdf
title_sort 9781003125860_10.4324_9781003125860-10.pdf
publisher Taylor & Francis
publishDate 2023
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