9780472903351.pdf

Why did enduring traditions of economic and political liberty emerge in Western Europe and not elsewhere? Representative democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law are crucial for establishing a just and prosperous society, which we usually treat as the fruits of the Renaissance and Enlighten...

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Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: University of Michigan Press 2023
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-633962024-03-28T08:18:57Z The Medieval Constitution of Liberty Salter, Alexander William Young, Andrew medieval constitution of liberty, economic freedom, political liberalism, medieval Europe, High Middle Ages, political property rights, rule of law, constitutionalism, political economy, Great Enrichment, Great Divergence, representative political institutions, representative assemblies, institutional economics, constitutional economics, polycentricity, federalism, feudalism, sovereignty, classical liberalism, medieval constitution thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government thema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JP Politics and government::JPH Political structure and processes::JPHC Constitution: government and the state thema EDItEUR::N History and Archaeology::NH History::NHD European history Why did enduring traditions of economic and political liberty emerge in Western Europe and not elsewhere? Representative democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law are crucial for establishing a just and prosperous society, which we usually treat as the fruits of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, as Western European societies put the Dark Ages behind them. In The Medieval Constitution of Liberty, Salter and Young point instead to the constitutional order that characterized the High Middle Ages. They provide a historical account of how this constitutional order evolved following the fall of the Western Roman Empire. This account runs from the settlements of militarized Germanic elites within the imperial frontiers, to the host of successor kingdoms in the sixth and seventh centuries, and through the short-lived Carolingian empire of the late eighth and ninth centuries and the so-called “feudal anarchy” that followed its demise. Given this unique historical backdrop, Salter and Young consider the resulting structures of political property rights. They argue that the historical reality approximated a constitutional ideal type, which they term polycentric sovereignty. Salter and Young provide a theoretical analysis of polycentric sovereignty, arguing that bargains between political property rights holders within that sort of constitutional order will lead to improvements in governance. 2023-06-07T09:11:45Z 2023-06-07T09:11:45Z 2023 book 9780472076017 9780472056019 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/63396 eng application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 9780472903351.pdf University of Michigan Press 10.3998/mpub.11991074 10.3998/mpub.11991074 e07ce9b5-7a46-4096-8f0c-bc1920e3d889 9780472076017 9780472056019 310 open access
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description Why did enduring traditions of economic and political liberty emerge in Western Europe and not elsewhere? Representative democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law are crucial for establishing a just and prosperous society, which we usually treat as the fruits of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, as Western European societies put the Dark Ages behind them. In The Medieval Constitution of Liberty, Salter and Young point instead to the constitutional order that characterized the High Middle Ages. They provide a historical account of how this constitutional order evolved following the fall of the Western Roman Empire. This account runs from the settlements of militarized Germanic elites within the imperial frontiers, to the host of successor kingdoms in the sixth and seventh centuries, and through the short-lived Carolingian empire of the late eighth and ninth centuries and the so-called “feudal anarchy” that followed its demise. Given this unique historical backdrop, Salter and Young consider the resulting structures of political property rights. They argue that the historical reality approximated a constitutional ideal type, which they term polycentric sovereignty. Salter and Young provide a theoretical analysis of polycentric sovereignty, arguing that bargains between political property rights holders within that sort of constitutional order will lead to improvements in governance.
title 9780472903351.pdf
spellingShingle 9780472903351.pdf
title_short 9780472903351.pdf
title_full 9780472903351.pdf
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title_full_unstemmed 9780472903351.pdf
title_sort 9780472903351.pdf
publisher University of Michigan Press
publishDate 2023
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