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oapen-20.500.12657-770202023-11-15T09:17:26Z Trust Responsibly Ohlhorst, Jakob arbitrariness;bizarreness;certainty;cognitive psychology;common sense;core cognition;deep disagreement;dual-process theory;entitlement;hinge epistemology;Jakob Ohlhorst;relativism;reliabilism;responsibilism;scepticism;skepticism;trust;virtue epistemology;Wittgenstein bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPK Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge This book offers a defence of Wrightean epistemic entitlement, one of the most prominent approaches to hinge epistemology. It also systematically explores the connections between virtue epistemology and hinge epistemology. According to hinge epistemology, any human belief set is built within and upon a framework of pre-evidential propositions – hinges – that cannot be justified. Epistemic entitlement argues that we are entitled to trust our hinges. But there remains a problem. Entitlement is inherently unconstrained and arbitrary: We can be entitled to any hinge proposition under the right circumstances. In this book, the author argues that we need a non-arbitrariness clause that protects entitlement from defeat. This clause, he argues, is to require epistemic virtue. Virtuous cognitive dispositions provide the non-arbitrariness clause that protects entitlement from defeat. The epistemic character of the agent who holds a particular set of hinges tells us something about the hinges’ epistemic status. Conversely, epistemic virtues are cognitive dispositions and capacities that rely on hinge propositions – without trusting in some hinges, we would be unable to exercise our virtues. Trust Responsibly will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on epistemology, Wittgenstein, and virtues. 2023-10-25T09:19:11Z 2023-10-25T09:19:11Z 2024 book 9781032449074 9781032460987 9781003374466 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/77020 eng Routledge Studies in Epistemology application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 9781000967258.pdf http://www.routledge.com Taylor & Francis Routledge 10.4324/9781003374466 10.4324/9781003374466 7b3c7b10-5b1e-40b3-860e-c6dd5197f0bb 07f61e34-5b96-49f0-9860-c87dd8228f26 9781032449074 9781032460987 9781003374466 Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) Routledge 160 Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung Swiss National Science Foundation open access
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This book offers a defence of Wrightean epistemic entitlement, one of the most prominent approaches to hinge epistemology. It also systematically explores the connections between virtue epistemology and hinge epistemology.
According to hinge epistemology, any human belief set is built within and upon a framework of pre-evidential propositions – hinges – that cannot be justified. Epistemic entitlement argues that we are entitled to trust our hinges. But there remains a problem. Entitlement is inherently unconstrained and arbitrary: We can be entitled to any hinge proposition under the right circumstances. In this book, the author argues that we need a non-arbitrariness clause that protects entitlement from defeat. This clause, he argues, is to require epistemic virtue. Virtuous cognitive dispositions provide the non-arbitrariness clause that protects entitlement from defeat. The epistemic character of the agent who holds a particular set of hinges tells us something about the hinges’ epistemic status. Conversely, epistemic virtues are cognitive dispositions and capacities that rely on hinge propositions – without trusting in some hinges, we would be unable to exercise our virtues.
Trust Responsibly will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on epistemology, Wittgenstein, and virtues.
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