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oapen-20.500.12657-851492023-11-17T02:23:56Z Chapter 2 Conscious and Unconscious Qualities Polák, Michal attention; higher-order theories of consciousness; inattentional blindness; masking; mental qualities; neurophenomenal structuralism; phenomenal content; unconscious mental states bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPM Philosophy of mind bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JM Psychology bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JM Psychology::JMR Cognition & cognitive psychology The chapter considers the possibility of separating phenomenality from consciousness. Perhaps the most serious consequence of this move is that it encourages the concept of unconscious qualities. This idea is not entirely new (Cf. Rosenthal 2010; Marvan and Polák 2017 where they call it dual model), but its wider acceptance is confronted with a lack of clarity about the relationships between fundamental concepts involved in the unconscious qualities framework. The main aim is to briefly introduce the dual framework, the standard orthodoxy (no-unconscious-qualities view), and further elaborate on particular conceptual issues arising in connection with the involvement of the three basic concepts: phenomenality, what-it’s-likeness (WIL), and consciousness. I will thus attempt to reconsider three types of conceptual relations: 1) phenomenality to WIL, 2) consciousness to phenomenality, and 3) consciousness to WIL. The chapter will address, among other things, two pressing issues that the dual framework entails, namely the status of consciousness and the distinction between unconscious qualities and WIL. 2023-11-16T09:01:57Z 2023-11-16T09:01:57Z 2024 chapter 9781032529790 9781032529745 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/85149 eng application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-3.pdf Taylor & Francis Conscious and Unconscious Mentality Routledge 10.4324/ 9781003409526- 3 10.4324/ 9781003409526- 3 7b3c7b10-5b1e-40b3-860e-c6dd5197f0bb 6b30f474-9a85-45a4-9234-2473310182a0 9781032529790 9781032529745 Routledge 21 open access
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English
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The chapter considers the possibility of separating phenomenality from consciousness. Perhaps the most serious consequence of this move is that it encourages the concept of unconscious qualities. This idea is not entirely new (Cf. Rosenthal 2010; Marvan and Polák 2017 where they call it dual model), but its wider acceptance is confronted with a lack of clarity about the relationships between fundamental concepts involved in the unconscious qualities framework. The main aim is to briefly introduce the dual framework, the standard orthodoxy (no-unconscious-qualities view), and further elaborate on particular conceptual issues arising in connection with the involvement of the three basic concepts: phenomenality, what-it’s-likeness (WIL), and consciousness. I will thus attempt to reconsider three types of conceptual relations: 1) phenomenality to WIL, 2) consciousness to phenomenality, and 3) consciousness to WIL. The chapter will address, among other things, two pressing issues that the dual framework entails, namely the status of consciousness and the distinction between unconscious qualities and WIL.
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9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-3.pdf
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9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-3.pdf
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9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-3.pdf
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9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-3.pdf
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9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-3.pdf
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Taylor & Francis
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2023
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1799945312445399040
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