9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-12.pdf

This chapter explores the notion of conscious and unconscious sensory qualities and challenges the traditional view that sensory qualities are exclusively conscious. Two arguments are offered for the existence of unconscious sensory qualities: the behavioural and the neural. The upshot of both argum...

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Έκδοση: Taylor & Francis 2023
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-851512023-11-17T02:23:57Z Chapter 9 The Brain-Based Argument for Unconscious Sensory Qualities Marvan, Tomas attention; higher-order theories of consciousness; inattentional blindness; masking; mental qualities; neurophenomenal structuralism; phenomenal content; unconscious mental states bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPM Philosophy of mind bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JM Psychology bic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JM Psychology::JMR Cognition & cognitive psychology This chapter explores the notion of conscious and unconscious sensory qualities and challenges the traditional view that sensory qualities are exclusively conscious. Two arguments are offered for the existence of unconscious sensory qualities: the behavioural and the neural. The upshot of both arguments is that the similarities between conscious and unconscious sensory states are much greater than typically assumed in both the philosophy of mind and the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness. In fact, both arguments (and especially the latter one, which is explored at some length in the chapter) support the view that the mechanisms of sensory qualities are literally the same in conscious and unconscious perceptual conditions. This has important implications for general theories of consciousness and for research on neural correlates of consciousness. 2023-11-16T09:16:55Z 2023-11-16T09:16:55Z 2024 chapter 9781032529790 9781032529745 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/85151 eng application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-12.pdf Taylor & Francis Conscious and Unconscious Mentality Routledge 10.4324/ 9781003409526- 12 10.4324/ 9781003409526- 12 7b3c7b10-5b1e-40b3-860e-c6dd5197f0bb 6b30f474-9a85-45a4-9234-2473310182a0 9781032529790 9781032529745 Routledge 18 open access
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language English
description This chapter explores the notion of conscious and unconscious sensory qualities and challenges the traditional view that sensory qualities are exclusively conscious. Two arguments are offered for the existence of unconscious sensory qualities: the behavioural and the neural. The upshot of both arguments is that the similarities between conscious and unconscious sensory states are much greater than typically assumed in both the philosophy of mind and the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness. In fact, both arguments (and especially the latter one, which is explored at some length in the chapter) support the view that the mechanisms of sensory qualities are literally the same in conscious and unconscious perceptual conditions. This has important implications for general theories of consciousness and for research on neural correlates of consciousness.
title 9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-12.pdf
spellingShingle 9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-12.pdf
title_short 9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-12.pdf
title_full 9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-12.pdf
title_fullStr 9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-12.pdf
title_full_unstemmed 9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-12.pdf
title_sort 9781003409526_10.4324_9781003409526-12.pdf
publisher Taylor & Francis
publishDate 2023
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