38457.pdf

I discuss Descartes’ metaphysics of selfhood, and relevant parts of contemporary philosophy regarding the first person. My two main concerns are the controversy that surrounds Descartes’ conception of conscientia, mistranslated as ‘consciousness’, and his conception of selfhood and its essential con...

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Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Firenze University Press 2023
Διαθέσιμο Online:https://books.fupress.com/doi/capitoli/979-12-215-0169-8.3
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-855922023-11-28T03:36:01Z Chapter Descartes on Selfhood, Conscientia, the First Person and Beyond Christofidou, Andrea René Descartes conscientia first person selfhood personhood freedom bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy I discuss Descartes’ metaphysics of selfhood, and relevant parts of contemporary philosophy regarding the first person. My two main concerns are the controversy that surrounds Descartes’ conception of conscientia, mistranslated as ‘consciousness’, and his conception of selfhood and its essential connection to conscientia. ‘I’-thoughts give rise to the most challenging philosophical questions. An answer to the questions concerning the peculiarities of the first person, self-identification and self-ascription, is to be found in Descartes’ notion of conscientia. His conception of selfhood insightfully informs his conception of personhood. I offer a unified account of selfhood, conscientia, the first person, and personhood anchored in the self’s authority of reason and autonomy of freedom. 2023-11-27T17:12:20Z 2023-11-27T17:12:20Z 2023 chapter ONIX_20231127_9791221501698_2 9791221501698 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/85592 eng Knowledge and its Histories application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International 38457.pdf https://books.fupress.com/doi/capitoli/979-12-215-0169-8.3 Firenze University Press 10.36253/979-12-215-0169-8.03 10.36253/979-12-215-0169-8.03 bf65d21a-78e5-4ba2-983a-dbfa90962870 9791221501698 1 32 Florence open access
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language English
description I discuss Descartes’ metaphysics of selfhood, and relevant parts of contemporary philosophy regarding the first person. My two main concerns are the controversy that surrounds Descartes’ conception of conscientia, mistranslated as ‘consciousness’, and his conception of selfhood and its essential connection to conscientia. ‘I’-thoughts give rise to the most challenging philosophical questions. An answer to the questions concerning the peculiarities of the first person, self-identification and self-ascription, is to be found in Descartes’ notion of conscientia. His conception of selfhood insightfully informs his conception of personhood. I offer a unified account of selfhood, conscientia, the first person, and personhood anchored in the self’s authority of reason and autonomy of freedom.
title 38457.pdf
spellingShingle 38457.pdf
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title_full_unstemmed 38457.pdf
title_sort 38457.pdf
publisher Firenze University Press
publishDate 2023
url https://books.fupress.com/doi/capitoli/979-12-215-0169-8.3
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