38460.pdf

In arguing against the likelihood of consciousness in non-human animals, Descartes advances a slippery slope argument that if thought were attributed to any one animal, it would have to be attributed to all, which is absurd. This paper examines the foundations of Thomas Willis’ comparative neuroanat...

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Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Firenze University Press 2023
Διαθέσιμο Online:https://books.fupress.com/doi/capitoli/979-12-215-0169-8.6
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spelling oapen-20.500.12657-855952023-11-28T03:33:47Z Chapter Foundations of Human and Animal Sensory Awareness: Descartes and Willis Brown, Deborah Key, Brian René Descartes Thomas Willis consciousness animal soul structure-determines-function principle immortality bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy In arguing against the likelihood of consciousness in non-human animals, Descartes advances a slippery slope argument that if thought were attributed to any one animal, it would have to be attributed to all, which is absurd. This paper examines the foundations of Thomas Willis’ comparative neuroanatomy against the background of Descartes’ slippery slope argument against animal consciousness. Inspired by Gassendi’s ideas about the corporeal soul, Thomas Willis distinguished between neural circuitry responsible for reflex behaviour and that responsible for cognitively or consciously mediated behaviour. This afforded Willis a non-arbitrary basis for distinguishing between animals with thought and consciousness and those without, a methodology which retains currency for neuroscience today. 2023-11-27T17:12:27Z 2023-11-27T17:12:27Z 2023 chapter ONIX_20231127_9791221501698_5 9791221501698 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/85595 eng Knowledge and its Histories application/pdf Attribution 4.0 International 38460.pdf https://books.fupress.com/doi/capitoli/979-12-215-0169-8.6 Firenze University Press 10.36253/979-12-215-0169-8.06 10.36253/979-12-215-0169-8.06 bf65d21a-78e5-4ba2-983a-dbfa90962870 9791221501698 1 19 Florence open access
institution OAPEN
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language English
description In arguing against the likelihood of consciousness in non-human animals, Descartes advances a slippery slope argument that if thought were attributed to any one animal, it would have to be attributed to all, which is absurd. This paper examines the foundations of Thomas Willis’ comparative neuroanatomy against the background of Descartes’ slippery slope argument against animal consciousness. Inspired by Gassendi’s ideas about the corporeal soul, Thomas Willis distinguished between neural circuitry responsible for reflex behaviour and that responsible for cognitively or consciously mediated behaviour. This afforded Willis a non-arbitrary basis for distinguishing between animals with thought and consciousness and those without, a methodology which retains currency for neuroscience today.
title 38460.pdf
spellingShingle 38460.pdf
title_short 38460.pdf
title_full 38460.pdf
title_fullStr 38460.pdf
title_full_unstemmed 38460.pdf
title_sort 38460.pdf
publisher Firenze University Press
publishDate 2023
url https://books.fupress.com/doi/capitoli/979-12-215-0169-8.6
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