The admissible contents of experience /

"Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience? Although perceptual experiences frequently give rise to beliefs, the content of these beliefs do not always simply reflect the contents of the experiences on which they are based. Instead, they often rest on background know...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: Wiley InterScience (Online service)
Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Hawley, Katherine (Katherine Jane), Macpherson, Fiona
Μορφή: Ηλ. βιβλίο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Chichester, West Sussex, UK ; Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
Θέματα:
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full Text via HEAL-Link
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245 0 4 |a The admissible contents of experience /  |c edited by Katherine Hawley and Fiona Macpherson. 
264 1 |a Chichester, West Sussex, UK ;  |a Malden, MA :  |b Wiley-Blackwell,  |c 2011. 
300 |a 1 online resource (200 pages) :  |b illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
505 0 |a Front Matter -- Introduction: The Admissible Contents of Experience / Fiona Macpherson -- Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content / Tim Bayne -- Seeing Causings and Hearing Gestures / S Butterfill -- Experience and Content / Alex Byrne -- Is Perception a Propositional Attitude? / Tim Crane -- Conscious Reference / Alva No︠ -- What are the Contents of Experiences? / Adam Pautz -- Aspect-Switching and Visual Phenomenal Character / Richard Price -- The Visual Experience of Causation / Susanna Siegel -- The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience / Michael Tye -- Index. 
505 8 |a Machine generated contents note: Introduction (Katherine Hawley, University of St. Andrews and Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow). -- 1. Perception And The Reach Of Phenomenal Content (Tim Bayne, University of Oxford). -- 2. Seeing Causings And Hearing Gestures (Steven Butterfill, University of Warwick). -- 3. Experience And Content (Alex Byrne, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). -- 4. Is Perception A Propositional Attitude? (Tim Crane, University College London). -- 5. Conscious Reference (Alva Noë, University of California, Berkeley). -- 6. What Are The Contents Of Experiences? (Adam Pautz, University of Texas at Austin). -- 7. Aspect-Switching And Visual Phenomenal Character (Richard Price, University of Oxford). -- 8. The Visual Experience Of Causation (Susanna Siegel, Harvard University). -- 9. The Admissible Contents Of Visual Experience (Michael Tye, University of Texas at Austin). 
520 |a "Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience? Although perceptual experiences frequently give rise to beliefs, the content of these beliefs do not always simply reflect the contents of the experiences on which they are based. Instead, they often rest on background knowledge and beliefs, as well as experience. This raises the question of how are we able to determine what the admissible contents of experience are, whether they include singular or existential contents, and whether they include contents pertaining to causation or natural kinds. The papers in this collection address these issues, together with questions concerning the nature of perceptual content. They deal with the central issues of whether perceptual content is similar to the content of the propositional attitudes; whether all states with content fall neatly into the categories of either belief or experience. The book also focuses on whether there exists a continuum from states that are more like perceptual experiences to states that are more like belief, and, indeed, ultimately whether we should consider perceptual experiences to have content at all. This ground-breaking volume is published in association with the journal Philosophical Quarterly"--  |c Provided by publisher. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
650 0 |a Experience. 
650 0 |a Perception. 
650 0 |a Evidence. 
650 0 |a Belief and doubt. 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Logic.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Movements  |x Humanism.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Belief and doubt.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00830124 
650 7 |a Evidence.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00917177 
650 7 |a Experience.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00918379 
650 7 |a Perception.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01057622 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
700 1 |a Hawley, Katherine  |q (Katherine Jane) 
700 1 |a Macpherson, Fiona. 
710 2 |a Wiley InterScience (Online service) 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |t Admissible contents of experience.  |d Chichester, West Sussex, UK ; Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011  |z 9781444343885  |w (OCoLC)757394208 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444343915  |z Full Text via HEAL-Link 
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