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|a MAIN
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|a Lesca, Humbert.
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|a Weak signals for strategic intelligence :
|b anticipation tool for managers /
|c Humbert Lesca, Nicolas Lesca.
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|a London :
|b ISTE ;
|c [2011]
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|a Hoboken, N.J. :
|b Wiley,
|c [2011]
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|c ©2011
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|a 1 online resource (xiv, 230 pages) :
|b illustrations
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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|a online resource
|b cr
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|a Adaption and rev. of: Les signaux faibles et la veille anticipative pour les decideurs. 2011.
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|a Includes bibliographical references and index.
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|a Contents note continued: 1.4.2. Difference between strategic information and day-to-day management information -- 1.4.3. Two types of anticipative information -- 1.5. Weak signals -- 1.5.1. Definition of a weak signal -- 1.5.2. An example of weak signal as the trigger to a warning -- 1.5.3. Should we prefer a "strong" but backward-looking signal, or a "weak" but forward-looking signal? -- 1.5.4. Conversion, transformation of a weak signal into an early warning signal -- 1.5.5. Should we refer to a "signal" or a "sign"? Intentionality of the sender -- 1.5.6. Weak signals ... or decoys, deceptions, and information asymmetry -- 1.5.7. Characteristics of a weak signal: "Stealthy information" -- 1.5.8. Sources emitting weak signals: Examples -- 1.6. Detecting weak signals -- 1.6.1. Individual intelligence (in the Latin sense of the word): A definition -- 1.6.2. Cognitive style of a person -- 1.6.3. Individual cognitive biases -- 1.6.4. Fear.
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|a Contents note continued: 1.7. Interpreting, amplifying and exploiting weak signals to support strategic decision making -- 1.7.1. Need for collective intelligence (CI) for interpreting weak signals -- 1.7.2. CM: Justification and definition of the process -- 1.7.3. Definition of CI as the emergence of CCM -- 1.7.4. From CCM to knowledge management -- 1.8. Puzzle® method for the operationalization of CCM -- 1.8.1. Issue: Why the puzzle metaphor? -- 1.8.2. Definition of the Puzzle® method -- 1.8.3. Fundamental hypotheses of the Puzzle® method -- 1.8.4. Work group and CI -- 1.9. Global VASIC process for detecting, recognizing and utilizing weak signals -- 1.9.1. Targeting of anticipative scanning and information sources -- 1.9.2. Tracking and individual selection of weak signals -- 1.9.3. Escalating information, collective/centralized selection and storage -- 1.9.4. Dissemination and preparation of information for CCM sessions -- 1.9.5. Animation.
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|a Contents note continued: 1.9.6. Measurements: Performance indicators of the VASIC process -- 1.10. Conclusion -- 1.10.1. Results on completion of Chapter 1 -- ch. 2 Detecting, Recognizing and Corroborating a Weak Signal: Applications -- 2.1. Recognition of a weak signal: Examples -- 2.1.1.A lady heading up the purchasing function at a car equipment manufacturer? How bizarre! -- 2.1.2. When a weak signal is displayed on a sign in the street! -- 2.1.3.A research center at EADS: Why Singapore? -- 2.1.4. Danone -- 2.2. Making a new weak signal reliable -- 2.2.1. Reliability of the information source -- 2.2.2.Comparing the weak signal with other information obtained previously -- 2.2.3. Consulting with an "expert" -- 2.2.4. Feedback from the animator to the gatekeeper who provided the weak signal -- 2.3. Conclusion -- 2.3.1. Result -- ch. 3 Utilization of Weak Signals, Collective Creation of Meaning: Applications.
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|a Contents note continued: 3.1. The Roger case: Should we fear this new entrant to our industry? (the banking sector) -- 3.1.1. Issues for Roger as a company -- 3.1.2. Context -- 3.1.3. Codexi -- 3.1.4. Information to be used -- 3.1.5. Conduct of the collective work session -- 3.1.6. Results -- 3.2. The case for "valorizing CO2 as a commodity": A preliminary study for the selection of a new strategic direction -- 3.2.1. The main problem: How to "give birth to an idea" within the Board of Directors (BoD)? -- 3.2.2. Challenge: Arousing the interest of the BoD -- 3.2.3. Preparing for the session (which will prove to be the first session) -- 3.2.4. Background of the experiment (first session) -- 3.2.5. Conduct of the session (first session) -- 3.2.6. Second session, three months later -- 3.2.7. Conclusion and post-scriptum -- 3.3. The Danone case. The ministry is worried: Are there signs showing that companies will destroy jobs over the next two years? Could Danone leave France?
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|a Contents note continued: 3.3.1. The issue at hand -- 3.3.2. Fresh interest in weak signals -- 3.3.3. Background: Lack of cross-disciplinarity -- 3.3.4.Organization and conduct of the experiment -- 3.3.5. Targeting of a field of study -- 3.3.6. Selection of Danone as an agent -- 3.3.7. Conduct of the CCM experiment -- 3.3.8. Conclusion at the close of the last session: Huge plausible risk on the horizon! -- 3.4. The Opel case: Initiating collective transversal intelligence to aid strategic decision-making -- 3.4.1. Issues and background -- 3.4.2. CI -- 3.4.3.Organizational context -- 3.4.4. Preparatory step upstream of the first CCM session -- 3.4.5. Conduct of the CCM session -- 3.4.6. Conclusions -- 3.5. Conclusion -- 3.5.1. Results -- ch. 4 Preparation of Weak Signals for Sessions in Collective Creation of Meaning: Applications -- 4.1. Introduction: Two starting situations -- 4.2. The Roger case (continued): How are the news briefs used in the Roger CCM session prepared?
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|a Contents note continued: 4.2.1. Preparation of the news briefs used in the CCM -- 4.2.2. The search for raw data: A substantial task -- 4.2.3. Extraction of news briefs: A time-consuming, delicate task -- 4.2.4. The Internet trap -- 4.3.COM2 valorization case: Automatic search for "news briefs" -- 4.3.1. Guiding idea: "Full text" distillation -- 4.3.2. Steps in the search for "possible weak signal" news briefs -- 4.4. The Danone case: Preparation of the weak signals -- 4.4.1."Manual" search -- 4.4.2."Manual" extraction -- 4.4.3. Automatic news briefs search and extraction -- 4.4.4. Conclusions on the "CO2 valorization" and "Danone" cases using the Approxima prototype -- 4.5. Software modules for assisting in the automatic search for news briefs -- 4.5.1. Lookup table of characteristic words for the field being explored. Continuation of the "CO2 valorization" case -- 4.5.2. Enhancing the anticipative-and characteristic-word bases.
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|a Contents note continued: 4.5.3. Semantics problems: Synonyms, polysemes and related matters -- 4.5.4. Software enabling "event searches" -- 4.5.5. Integration platform for commercially available software modules -- 4.6. Conclusion -- 4.6.1. Result.
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|a English adaptation of: Les signaux faibles et la veille anticipative pour les décideurs.
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588 |
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|a Print version record.
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650 |
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|a Strategic planning.
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650 |
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|a Management.
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650 |
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|a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
|x Corporate Governance.
|2 bisacsh
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650 |
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|a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
|x Leadership.
|2 bisacsh
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650 |
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|a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
|x Organizational Development.
|2 bisacsh
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|a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
|x Workplace Culture.
|2 bisacsh
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650 |
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|a Management.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01007141
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650 |
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|a Strategic planning.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01134371
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655 |
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|a Electronic books.
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700 |
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|a Lesca, Nicolas.
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700 |
1 |
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|a Lesca, Humbert.
|t Signaux faibles et la veille anticipative pour les decideurs.
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776 |
0 |
8 |
|i Print version:
|a Lesca, Humbert.
|t Weak signals for strategic intelligence.
|d London : ISTE; Hoboken, N.J. : Wiley, ©2011
|z 9781848213180
|w (DLC) 2011031444
|w (OCoLC)745766015
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856 |
4 |
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|u https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118602775
|z Full Text via HEAL-Link
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