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oapen-20.500.12657-578452022-08-09T03:03:35Z Chapter 6 Equivalence in Imagination Berto, Francesco equivalence, imagination, reality-oriented mental, simulation bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPK Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge bic Book Industry Communication::H Humanities::HP Philosophy::HPM Philosophy of mind Ch. 6: One sense of imagination that matters in epistemology has the word mean reality-oriented mental simulation (ROMS): we suppose that something is the case, develop the supposition by importing background knowledge and beliefs, and check what is true in the imagined scenario. What is the logic of ROMS? Imagination has a reputation for being logically anarchic. In particular, it s hyperintensional: we can imagine A without imagining a necessarily equivalent B. This work considers a Principle of Equivalence in Imagination which, if accepted, will limit the anarchy: when A and B are equivalent in imagination, one will imagine the same things after supposing either in ROMS. What is equivalence in imagination? It is suggested that it s cognitive equivalence. A and B are cognitively equivalent for one when they play the same role in one s cognitive life: whatever one understands, concludes, etc., given either, one does, given the other. ROMS is logically modelled via variably strict modals. Two formal semantics are proposed for them: one uses possible worlds plus an algebra of topics; the other resorts to impossible worlds. The two deal with equivalence in imagination in subtly different ways. 2022-08-08T12:38:08Z 2022-08-08T12:38:08Z 2021 chapter 9781032018935 9780367480561 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/57845 eng application/pdf Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 9781003041979_10.4324_9781003041979-9.pdf Taylor & Francis Epistemic Uses of Imagination Routledge 10.4324/9781003041979–9 10.4324/9781003041979–9 7b3c7b10-5b1e-40b3-860e-c6dd5197f0bb a96255d3-25ea-4ce3-bfad-49f673d26df8 d94bb91a-b658-466f-b219-dc59e8220efa 9781032018935 9780367480561 Routledge 20 Universiteit van Amsterdam University of Amsterdam open access
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Ch. 6: One sense of imagination that matters in epistemology has the word mean reality-oriented mental simulation (ROMS): we suppose that something is the case, develop the supposition by importing background knowledge and beliefs, and check what is true in the imagined scenario. What is the logic of ROMS? Imagination has a reputation for being logically anarchic. In particular, it s hyperintensional: we can imagine A without imagining a necessarily equivalent B. This work considers a Principle of Equivalence in Imagination which, if accepted, will limit the anarchy: when A and B are equivalent in imagination, one will imagine the same things after supposing either in ROMS. What is equivalence in imagination? It is suggested that it s cognitive equivalence. A and B are cognitively equivalent for one when they play the same role in one s cognitive life: whatever one understands, concludes, etc., given either, one does, given the other. ROMS is logically modelled via variably strict modals. Two formal semantics are proposed for them: one uses possible worlds plus an algebra of topics; the other resorts to impossible worlds. The two deal with equivalence in imagination in subtly different ways.
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9781003041979_10.4324_9781003041979-9.pdf
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9781003041979_10.4324_9781003041979-9.pdf
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9781003041979_10.4324_9781003041979-9.pdf
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9781003041979_10.4324_9781003041979-9.pdf
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9781003041979_10.4324_9781003041979-9.pdf
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9781003041979_10.4324_9781003041979-9.pdf
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9781003041979_10.4324_9781003041979-9.pdf
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Taylor & Francis
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2022
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1771297623997677568
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